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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AT FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
 
 
“In the early 1990s, Freddie Mac promoted itself to investors as ‘Steady Freddie,’ a 
company of strong and steady growth in profits.  During that period the company developed a 
corporate culture that placed a very high priority on meeting those expectations, including, when 
necessary, using means that failed to meet its obligations to investors, regulators and the public.” 
 
Report of the Special Examination of Freddie Mac, 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 
Dec. 2003, p. i. 
 
“Characteristics of [Fannie Mae’s] culture include… an executive compensation structure 
that rewarded management for meeting goals tied to earnings-per-share, a metric subject to 
manipulation by management.” 
 
Report of Findings to Date:  Special Examination of 
Fannie Mae, Office of Compliance, Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Sept. 17, 
2004, p. i. 
 
 
Financial economists long have advocated tying top executives’ pay to the performance 
of their firms.  Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy summarize the results of years of 
intensive academic study of the managerial-agency problem in a 1990 Harvard Business Review 
article, “CEO Incentives:  It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How.”  Jensen and Murphy 
emphasize that CEOs respond to incentives, and executive compensation is first and foremost an 
incentive system.  If shareholders want executives to act as if they own the firm, executive 
compensation should vary with firm value.  In practice, this means that top executives’ pay and 
personal wealth should be tied explicitly and substantially to the stock price or some accounting-
based metric that might bear on the stock price over time. 
Stock- and option-based executive compensation swept across the corporate landscape 
both in the United States and abroad during the 1990s, as corporate boards attempted to align the 
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interests of managers with those of shareholders.  The privatized, publicly-traded housing 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were no exceptions.  
Indeed, Congressional reform legislation in 1992 (Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety 
and Soundness Act) mandated “pay for performance” as a substantial component of GSE 
executives’ total compensation. 
The original advocates of pay for performance expected that firms easily could induce 
executives to create shareholder value by providing heavily stock- and option-based 
compensation packages.  These expectations may have been too optimistic.  What financial 
economists call “high-powered incentive” structures sometimes create new distortions that can 
be as harmful as the managerial-agency problem they seek to eliminate.  Jensen, Murphy, and 
Eric G. Wruck (2004) admit that “…while executive compensation can be a powerful tool for 
reducing the agency conflicts between managers and the firm, compensation can also be a 
substantial source of agency costs if it is not managed properly (p. 98).” 
Flawed executive-compensation plans may have caused or exacerbated many of the 
recent corporate-governance scandals.  The consequences of improperly managed executive-
compensation arrangements extend beyond the executives themselves, to the firm’s shareholders, 
employees, and other stakeholder groups.  When the firms involved are government-sponsored 
enterprises that have grown so large as to pose systemic risks to the financial system, the 
consequences of improper executive incentives are amplified.  The critique of Fannie Mae’s 
corporate governance delivered in September 2004 by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) reinforced the point revealed in Freddie Mac’s own internally discovered 
governance crisis of June 2003:  Executive incentives were poorly aligned not only with 
stakeholder groups but potentially also with shareholders’ long-run interests. 
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This article describes the misaligned incentives in the executive-compensation schemes at 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  We argue that the problem at the stockholder-owned housing 
GSEs potentially is worse than it is in the average S&P 100 firm because the GSEs are different 
in terms of their financial structure, the flexibility of their business models and financial-
reporting systems to respond to executive incentives, and the range of stakeholder groups that 
have legitimate interests in their governance.  Yet, executive-compensation plans at the GSEs are 
composed of a large stock- and earnings-based component that is benchmarked to financial 
institutions that are different from Fannie and Freddie.  More appropriate and targeted 
performance goals—such as limiting interest-rate risk and meeting affordable-housing goals—
also are part of GSE executive-compensation plans, but they make up a much smaller component 
of bonus awards. 
The design of executive compensation is central to the governance of the GSEs. In our 
view, the relationship between executive-compensation arrangements at the GSEs and their well-
documented earnings-management abuses has not received adequate attention in the discussion 
of possible GSE reforms. 
Whether Congress chooses to embark on a transition to true GSE privatization or moves 
toward a stricter, more bank-like regulatory regime, a focus on executive compensation will 
remain critical for successful reform.  If a political consensus ever emerged in favor of 
privatization, it would be important to remove incentives for GSE managers to maximize the 
value to shareholders of the “implicit guarantee” during the transition.  The best way to prevent 
last-minute increases in risk would be to eliminate top management’s incentive to maximize 
current shareholder wealth at the expense of taxpayers. 
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On the other hand, if privatization remains politically impossible, increased regulatory 
control over some aspects of executive compensation could strengthen the safety and soundness 
of the GSEs.   Bank regulators can constrain bank executives’ compensation in some 
circumstances, which limits management’s incentive to take excessive risk.  If GSE supervisors 
had authority over compensation plans similar to that exercised by bank regulators, the risks 
posed by the enterprises to financial stability could be greatly reduced. 
To be sure, an increase in supervisory control over Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
executive compensation might increase the confidence of market participants in the 
government’s implicit guarantee of GSE liabilities.  Wallison (2004) argues that further 
entrenching supervision would make privatization less feasible.  However, we contend that 
supervisory control over compensation is necessary to prevent excessive risk taking whether 
GSEs remain under government supervision indefinitely or are set on the path to privatization. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE GSE BUSINESS MODEL:   
MOVING FROM OFF TO ON BALANCE SHEET 
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the GSEs’ current operations is their exploitation 
of a perceived implicit guarantee of their senior liabilities by the U.S. Treasury.  The perceived 
guarantee allows them to issue large amounts of unsecured debt cheaply in order to increase both 
their assets and their leverage.  Frame and White (2004) describe in great detail the housing-
finance activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the privileges they enjoy; we do not repeat 
them here.  However, one aspect of the recent evolution of the GSEs’ business models that does 
call for emphasis here is the choice they face between intermediating mortgage flows on or off 
their balance sheets.  On-balance-sheet intermediation consists largely of a GSE issuing senior 
unsecured debt in capital markets and then using the proceeds to fund investments in mortgages 
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or mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  Equity provides about 3.50 percent of the funds for 
GSEs’ on-balance-sheet mortgage financing; unsecured debt provides most of the rest.  The 
GSEs are able to fund their highly profitable operations primarily with unsecured debt both 
because the assets are of high quality and investors perceive an implicit guarantee of GSE senior 
liabilities by the Federal Government. 
In contrast to on-balance-sheet intermediation, off-balance-sheet intermediation consists 
of providing a guarantee to investors of timely repayment of principal and interest from an issue 
of MBS.  In the guarantee business, the GSE sheds interest-rate risk.  Only when mortgages or 
MBS stay on the balance sheet do the GSEs retain interest-rate risk.  Whether the intermediation 
of mortgages is on or off the balance sheet, the GSE absorbs the credit risk. 
The on-balance-sheet business of both GSEs grew much faster than the off-balance-sheet 
business during the 1990s.  Rapid growth of on-balance sheet business allowed the GSEs to take 
advantage of their access to cheap financing.  As we discuss further below, the fact that the 
GSEs’ current stock- and option-based executive-compensation plans were put in place at about 
the same time that the GSEs’ decade of rapid balance-sheet expansion began is worth noting.   
Of course, the residential-mortgage market itself has grown rapidly—at a compounded 
annual rate of 8.6 percent in the decade through June 2004.  Yet the GSEs have retained an 
increasing share of this expanding market.  The off-balance-sheet business grew at a 5-percent 
annual rate in the 10 years through June 2004, while the on-balance-sheet business grew at a 17-
percent annual rate—much faster than the mortgage market itself.   
While the GSEs pursued high growth in the on-balance-sheet business, they also 
maintained high leverage.  Fannie Mae held core capital of about 3.65 percent on June 30, 2004.  
A typical U.S. depository institution with the same portfolio of assets would be required to hold 
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core capital equivalent to at least 5 percent of assets under bank regulators’ so-called “leverage 
ratio.”  The shifting business mix during the 1990s toward on-balance-sheet business with high 
leverage highlights the ability of GSE executives to take advantage of perceived profit 
opportunities when given the incentives to do so.  
In sum, there is little question that the housing GSEs’ growth—particularly on their 
balance sheets—has been very rapid in recent years.  At the same time, the GSEs operate with 
much higher leverage than a typical bank, even if the bank held an identical portfolio of assets.  
As we discuss below, their high leverage and importance in the mortgage-finance market of the 
GSEs create a need for enhanced supervision and control over executive-compensation plans, 
even during a possible transition to privatization.  
THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF THE GSES:  NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
AND DEBTHOLDERS’ COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM 
Why are the GSEs regulated today, and why might more stringent oversight be justified 
in the future?  We contend that there are two basic reasons for government oversight of the 
GSEs.  First, there may be costs associated with a GSE’s failure that shareholders do not 
adequately take into account—so-called negative externalities.  The GSEs’ importance to the 
mortgage market in particular, and the financial system more generally, has grown enormously 
in recent years.  The disruptive failure of a housing GSE—however remote the possibility—
could interrupt the flow of credit to the mortgage market, constraining many households’ 
housing choices.  Failure of a GSE also might threaten financial stability, possibly through 
extensive bank and thrift holdings of over $1 trillion of GSE debt.  However, GSE shareholders 
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on the verge of losing their investments would have inadequate financial incentives to limit 
losses on GSE assets.  
Negative externalities are perhaps the most formidable obstacle to complete, credible 
privatization of the GSEs.  It is, of course, also the source of the market’s perception of an 
implicit guarantee of GSE liabilities.  The undeniable economic logic of a future government 
bailout of some kind, in turn, justifies government oversight now to contain the expected cost of 
the contingent liability.   
The second reason for government oversight of the GSEs is the fact that the thousands of 
holders of GSE debt today need a delegated monitor to overcome a “collective-action” or “free-
rider” problem.  In fact, some 7,400 U.S. commercial banks—95 percent of all banks—hold 
some GSE debt today.  Thousands of other domestic and foreign financial institutions, non-
financial private investors, mutual funds, and foreign governments hold GSE debt also.  No 
single holder of GSE debt owns more than a trivial fraction of the outstanding debt.  Thus, the 
collective-action problem among GSE debtholders is acute.  This would be most apparent and 
critical in the event of a GSE default or restructuring that required creditor decision-making.  
The basic delegated-monitor argument for regulation of banks is laid out in Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994), where the authors outline their “representation hypothesis” of bank regulation.  
Market discipline of a firm with many small, dispersed, uncoordinated debtholders may provoke 
a market panic.  Among uninsured banks, a panic starts with runs on individual distressed banks, 
which then spread contagiously to unrelated and sometimes healthy banks.  History shows that 
unchecked banking panics can disrupt the credit and payments mechanisms of an economy, the 
hallmarks of financial stability. 
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For GSEs, a panic would begin as a funding-liquidity crisis, with negative implications 
for the intermediation of residential-mortgage credit and for the liquidity of debtholders’ (notably 
banks’) portfolios.  A market panic that spread from Fannie Mae to Freddie Mac, or vice versa, 
probably would not harm the payments system because the Federal Reserve easily could liquefy 
banks via the discount window or open-market operations.  However, it certainly would interrupt 
the flow of funds to the mortgage market.  Such an interruption would matter because home-
mortgage borrowing has constituted almost half of all flows of credit to the domestic non-
federal, non-financial sectors of the U.S. economy during the last 20 years, according to the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts.   
A single dominant debtholder can, in principle, overcome the collective-action problem if 
the “delegated monitor” assumes a substantial financial exposure itself (hence facing a financial 
incentive to perform due diligence, even while “free riders” do not).  A privately owned 
dominant monitor would exert tremendous influence over a GSE but might act to the detriment 
of small debtholders or other stakeholders.  For example, abuse of its dominant market position 
by the New York (Bankers’) Clearinghouse during the Panic of 1907 was a major factor leading 
to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.  Thus, the first link between a need 
for a delegated monitor and government regulation is the desirability of avoiding undue market 
power accruing to a private, profit-maximizing entity.   
As noted, a delegated monitor must have a financial incentive to monitor effectively.  In 
the case of banking, the government’s guarantee of the stability of the banking system—whether 
explicit or implicit—serves to underpin the government’s incentive to monitor bank safety and 
soundness.  Supervision is an investment in controlling contingent liabilities. 
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We believe a similar argument applies to the GSEs.  The government’s financial 
exposures to the GSEs appear in several forms.  Most significantly, the government is exposed in 
the form of an implicit guarantee of GSE senior debt due to the fear of financial instability were 
government support not forthcoming in a crisis.  Indirect exposures exist through insured bank 
and thrift holdings of GSE securities and through large-bank dealings with the GSEs in OTC 
derivatives markets.  Direct exposures exist in the form of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York’s credit exposure to the GSEs on Fedwire (the large-value payments system), and in the 
form of the GSEs’ $2.25 billion open line of credit at the Treasury.   
The key insight of the representation hypothesis as it applies to the GSEs is that 
significant government financial exposure to the GSEs allows GSE debtholders effectively to 
delegate the task of carrying out due diligence to a government supervisor.  Delegated 
monitoring with significant financial exposure transforms the regulator from a bureaucratic 
overseer with little at stake into a risk manager facing a large contingent liability.  The scale of 
that liability is very difficult to control, however, because the GSE has considerable flexibility 
and discretion in how it operates.  This suggests that governance of the GSEs and protection of 
taxpayers’ interests might benefit from greater supervisory control of executive compensation. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
IN REGULATED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Van Order (2000) contends that GSEs and banks should be seen as competing models of 
government intervention into the financial system —“dueling charters,” in his words. A 
qualitative similarity exists between insured banks and implicitly guaranteed GSEs.  In both 
cases, government guarantees make the charters viable.  Likewise, government supervision limits 
the cost of providing the guarantees, while the contingent liabilities, in turn, fortify the 
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government’s incentive to provide effective oversight.  Van Order’s micro-economic analysis of 
banks and GSEs, together with the rationale for regulation sketched above, provides an 
appropriate framework for analyzing executive compensation at the GSEs.  
To be sure, the rights and responsibilities of corporate shareholders and debtholders 
usually are strictly segregated, with no obligation for one class of claimant to consider the 
interests of other classes.  However, this demarcation historically has been blurred in the 
governance of U.S. banks.  Macey and O’Hara (2003) point out that, after World War I, U.S. 
courts supported a fiduciary duty imposed on bank directors to indemnify debt claimants.  This 
was the era of “double liability” for banks in some states, meaning that bank shareholders could 
be required to pay in additional capital if a bank was on the verge of default. 
A modern example of the extra duty that bank owners owe to debtholders (and 
depositors’ representative, the supervisor) is the framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
regulations incorporated in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991.  Similar provisions for GSEs were incorporated in the Federal Housing 
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992.  The PCA framework allows regulators 
effectively to seize control of banks before their equity is exhausted—a “taking” that has been 
upheld in court.   
The current discussion about extending “bank-like supervision” to the GSEs includes 
more than giving the GSE supervisor a seat at the boardroom table, of course. But we believe 
this is an important aspect of increased GSE supervision because the board of directors 
determines executive-compensation arrangements which, in turn, determine how the firm will be 
run.  A firm’s “corporate culture” includes not just strategic direction and risk-taking decisions, 
but also the design of financial-reporting systems and the integrity of internal controls.  
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Economists call executive-compensation packages that entail high sensitivity of an 
executive’s annual pay and personal wealth to changes in the company’s stock price (or related 
performance measures, such as earnings per share)  “high-powered incentive contracts.”  
Conversely, executive-compensation packages that are largely insensitive to changes in the 
company’s stock price (or other performance measures) are termed “low-powered incentive 
contracts.”   
Financial theory suggests that optimal executive-compensation arrangements at publicly 
held corporations depend on the operations, financial structure, market opportunities, size, and 
public purpose (if any) of the firm (John and John, 1993; John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000; 
Adams and Mehran, 2003).  In particular, top executives should face greater sensitivity of pay to 
performance, the: 
  Less transparent is the firm’s business model; 
  Lower is the firm’s leverage; 
  Weaker or more variable is the firm’s cash flow; 
  Greater are the firm’s growth opportunities; 
  Smaller is the firm’s size (market capitalization); and 
  Less important are non-shareholder stakeholders in the firm. 
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The logic behind each criterion for designing optimal executive compensation is quite intuitive.   
  Transparency of the business model  The GSEs’ business models are quite 
transparent, as their top officers frequently stress publicly when arguing that their 
firms do not pose significant systemic risks to the financial system.  Their two 
business lines—investment portfolio and guarantee business—are straightforward.  
Their assets consist almost exclusively of unencumbered (unpledged) marketable 
securities, which could be valued and sold quite easily.  Thus, the high degree of 
transparency of their business model should result in a minimal emphasis on high-
powered incentives, which are needed most when the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders is very large. 
  Leverage  The GSEs operate with high leverage, even compared to banks.  John and 
John (1993) explain theoretically why high leverage should decrease the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of a firm’s executive compensation.  Adams and Mehran 
(2003) find empirical evidence that option pay is less at banks than at other, less-
levered firms.  In effect, leverage itself is a high-powered incentive device; executive 
compensation should not amplify the risk-taking incentives already present.  Thus, on 
this criterion, GSE executive compensation should be relatively low-powered. 
  Cash-flow variability and availability  A firm with highly variable cash flows, like 
one that is not transparent to outside investors, needs to focus executives’ efforts on 
generating sustainable creation of value by giving them powerful performance 
incentives.  The GSEs’ businesses and cash flows are relatively stable—that is what 
allows them to operate with high leverage, after all.  Thus, executive compensation 
should be low-powered on this account.  Because cash flows are available to pay cash 
salaries almost without fail, there is less need to provide deferred compensation in the 
form of stock or options. 
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  Growth opportunities  A firm that is valued by investors primarily for the 
investments it may make in the future needs to provide entrepreneurial incentives to 
its executives.  The GSEs’ growth has been decelerating for some time, and they 
appear near the saturation point in terms of the share of the conforming-mortgage 
market they can profitably intermediate.  As Warren Buffett and other former and 
current investors who assign extremely low P/E ratios to the GSEs have concluded, 
the fastest growth of the GSEs is behind them.  Executive compensation should be 
low-powered on the basis of the GSEs’ relatively small growth opportunities. 
  Firm size (market capitalization)  The larger is a firm’s market capitalization, the 
more difficult it is to provide the CEO with a meaningful equity stake in the 
company.  For this reason, high-powered incentive contracts are more expensive for 
larger firms.  The GSEs’ market capitalizations are large, so their executive 
compensation should de-emphasize pay for performance on this ground. 
  Importance of stakeholders other than shareholders  Perhaps the most compelling 
reason of all for the GSEs to de-emphasize high-powered executive-compensation 
contracts is that relevant and important stakeholder groups extend far beyond 
shareholders.  As we discussed above, GSEs are like banks in that they may pose 
externalities to the financial system and the economy.  Moreover, the GSEs’ explicit 
public mission to support the housing-finance market means that their reason for 
existing extends beyond the maximization of shareholder wealth.  To fulfill this 
public mission, the GSEs must remain safe and sound—i.e., officers and directors 
should take into account debtholders’ and taxpayers’ interests in avoiding insolvency. 
The GSEs arguably fall near the low-powered end of the scale on every compensation 
criterion noted here.  That is, optimal executive-compensation arrangements at the GSEs should 
entail a smaller role for stock and options than at the average publicly owned corporation.  Yet, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac compensate their top executives with notably high-powered 
incentives.  In 2003, for example, Fannie Mae CEO Franklin D. Raines received a base salary of 
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about $1 million, an annual bonus of about $4.4 million, and long-term compensation awards in 
the form of stock and options of almost $15 million.  At the end of 2003, Mr. Raines owned 
outright Fannie Mae stock worth $17.4 million, while he owned options exercisable within 60 
days to control an additional $113 million of Fannie Mae stock.  Given the significant role of 
earnings-per-share targets in determining his eligibility for the annual bonus award, Mr. Raines’ 
compensation package (including changes in the value of his Fannie Mae stock and options) 
predominantly consists of high-powered incentives.  Executive-compensation arrangements are 
similar at Freddie Mac.    
The boards of directors at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not solely responsible for 
designing inappropriate executive compensation, however.  Congress enshrined pay-for-
performance in the 1992 reforms of the GSEs’ chartering acts.  Fannie Mae’s charter act, for 
example, requires that a “significant portion of... compensation... be based upon performance.”  
According to Fannie Mae’s 10-K, executive compensation should “maintain comparability” with 
executive-compensation plans at “peer institutions.”  As implemented, this means the company’s 
compensation committee targets cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) at approximately the 
50
th percentile of the distribution of other large financial-services companies, and total 
compensation (cash plus stock-based awards) at approximately the 65
th percentile. 
We believe that the GSE regulator (OFHEO) should have a greater ability to constrain 
executive compensation.  A basis for intervention is suggested in the legislative history of the 
Fannie Mae Charter Act, in Senate Report No. 1123 (May 15, 1968): 
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...it is the intent of the Committee that the regulatory powers of the 
Secretary will not extend to the FNMA’s internal affairs, such as 
personnel, salary, and other usual corporate matters, except where 
the exercise of such powers is necessary to protect the financial 
interests of the Federal Government or as otherwise necessary to 
assure that the purposes of the FNMA Charter Act are carried out 
[italics added].  
While this statement of the intent of Congress is consistent with greater regulatory oversight of 
the GSEs’ executive-compensation plans, legislation (12 USC 4518(b)) explicitly prohibits the 
Director of OFHEO from setting a “specific level or range of compensation.” 
There is some movement on the executive-compensation front already.  OFHEO’s 
proposed corporate-governance reforms, published in the Federal Register of April 12, 2004, 
include a requirement that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s executive compensation be 
“appropriate and reasonable,” rather than merely “appropriate and comparable.” 
OFHEO is proposing to… [add] language that would prohibit compensation in 
excess of what is appropriate for these government-sponsored enterprises, in 
addition to what is reasonable (as the section currently reads) and consistent with 
their long-term goals.  The addition of this language is intended to underscore the 
impropriety of compensation incentives that excessively focus the attention of 
management and employees on short-term earnings performance…. 
 
The proposed compensation requirement in no way detracts from the 
obligations of board members and management to meet their responsibilities to 
shareholders, but reflects the attention that needs to be paid as well to other 
important considerations in directing the course and conduct of an Enterprise. 
(Federal Register, Vol. 69, N. 70, Monday, April 12, 2004, pp. 19126-29) 
 
OFHEO recognizes that the public has a right to demand from GSEs, like banks, a higher 
standard of corporate governance. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Borrowing restrictions and higher capital requirements could, in principle, counter the 
most obvious signs of aggressive risk-taking by GSEs.  But blunt restrictions are unlikely to 
prevent smart, stock- and option-fueled managers from reaching a risk-return trade-off they 
believe maximizes shareholder wealth—as well as their own.  From a public-policy perspective, 
the crucial task is to recalibrate managerial incentives to decrease the large risk appetite of the 
owners of a highly leveraged financial institution that is perceived by many capital-market 
participants to enjoy a government guarantee of its liabilities.  Thus, corporate governance—and 
executive-compensation arrangements in particular—should be an important component of the 
reform agenda.  In turn, the GSEs’ safety-and-soundness regulator—who is essentially the 
debtholders’ and taxpayers’ representative—must be admitted to the GSEs’ boardroom in a way 
that is atypical of an ordinary publicly held company.  This intrusion into the board’s oversight 
of executive-compensation plans is justified given the GSEs’ public purposes and their large 
potential cost to taxpayers.   
Recent proposed amendments to OFHEO’s corporate-governance framework for the 
GSEs would allow the regulator to require compensation to be “reasonable and appropriate” 
rather than merely “reasonable and comparable.”  Authority for OFHEO to participate actively 
in the setting of GSE executive compensation would be fitting either as part of an enhanced 
supervisory regime or as part of a transition to privatization. 
In the wake of OFHEO’s investigations into Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s accounting 
practices, there are signs that GSE owners and directors have begun to appreciate how important 
executive-compensation arrangements are in establishing the firms’ cultures and setting an 
appropriate “tone at the top.”  There is no guarantee that GSE shareholders and directors will 
  16 
follow through, however.  Prudent public policy requires greater supervisory control over 
executive compensation at the GSEs, which would follow a precedent set in banking. 
Where does this leave privatization?  We believe any viable plan to privatize the GSEs 
must explain:  a) how the negative externalities surrounding a GSE failure would be effectively 
minimized by private market discipline alone, and b) how the tens of thousands of dispersed 
GSE debtholders could exert effective market discipline without creating episodes of 
uncoordinated, contagious, and disruptive liquidity crises in GSE debt markets.  Any transition to 
privatization should include government oversight, including strong supervisory control over 
executive-compensation plans. 
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